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ABSTRACT 
  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act guarantees to 
children with disabilities the right to receive a “free appropriate public 
education.” This Note argues that the Supreme Court decisions 
Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v. Murphy, cases dealing with 
procedural aspects of the Act, undermine a prior trend in IDEA 
litigation—a trend that had increased the substantive and procedural 
rights of children with disabilities. Considered together, the Schaffer 
and Arlington decisions ignore the realities of the litigation process 
and impose significant burdens on parents attempting to ensure that 
their children receive the free appropriate education to which they are 
entitled. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education1 proclaimed the profound importance of education, 
recognizing it as a right that must be “made available to all on equal 
terms”:2 
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most 
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 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 2. Id. at 493. 
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basic public responsibilities . . . . It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child 
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.3 
Despite this emphatic language, the majority of special needs 
children4 in the United States did not receive any form of public 
education for more than fifteen years after Brown.5 Before the 1970s, 
parents were left to pay for private educational services for their 
special needs children or forego educational opportunities 
altogether.6 Those few special needs children who were educated in 
public schools received inadequate educations and were isolated from 
other students at these schools.7 
As of 2006, more than 6.5 million children,8 nearly 14 percent of 
the total student population, received special education services in 
public school systems in the United States.9 These services were 
provided under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA).10 The IDEA provides a basic framework within which each 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. The terms “special needs children” and “special education students” are used 
interchangeably throughout this Note to indicate children with disabilities who are provided 
with services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 
 5. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (Supp. 
IV 2004) (stating that before the enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
in 1975, the educational needs of special education students were not met and “the children 
were excluded entirely from the public school system and from being educated with their 
peers”). The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA) was later amended to 
become the IDEA. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (Supp. IV 2004) (originally enacted as The 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774 
(1975)). 
 6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (“[A] lack of adequate resources within the public system 
forced families to find services outside the public school system.”). 
 7. See id. (Before the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, “children [with 
disabilities] did not receive appropriate educational services; the children were excluded entirely 
from the public school system and from being educated with their peers; [or] undiagnosed 
disabilities prevented the children from having a successful educational experience.”). 
 8. Amicus Committee Supporting Petitioner, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 
528 (2005), Statement of the Council of the Parent Attorneys and Advocates (Jan. 2006), 
http://copaa.org/news/schaffer.html [hereinafter Amicus Committee Statement of Parent 
Attorneys and Advocates]. 
 9. THOMAS D. SNYDER, MINI-DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2006, at 8, available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007067.pdf. 
 10. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (Supp. IV 2004). 
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state must supply special education services to its students.11 Its stated 
purpose is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available 
to them a free appropriate public education” (FAPE).12 Adopted 
under Spending Clause powers, the IDEA requires states accepting 
federal money for education to provide special education services to 
children with disabilities.13 The IDEA’s goal—to ensure all children 
receive a free appropriate public education—is accomplished by 
developing an individualized education plan (IEP) for each disabled 
student.14 If parents are unsatisfied with their child’s IEP, they may 
request an impartial due process hearing.15 If they are still unsatisfied 
with the result of that hearing, parents may appeal the decision to the 
state educational agency16 or file a civil suit.17 In this way, parents have 
a standardized process to ensure their children are receiving an 
appropriate education in the public schools. Yet despite these 
dramatic improvements in the provision of special education services, 
efforts must still be taken to better protect the rights of special 
education students and their parents, especially as a result of changes 
in the procedural safeguards of the IDEA and its interpretation by 
the Supreme Court. 
Two Supreme Court decisions from October Term 2005 highlight 
the ways in which seemingly minute procedural issues can 
dramatically affect IDEA litigation. First, in Schaffer v. Weast,18 the 
Supreme Court determined that the “burden of proof in an 
administrative hearing challenging [the sufficiency of] an IEP is 
properly placed upon the party seeking relief.”19 Seven months later, 
in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy,20 
 
 11. Judith M. Gerber & Sheryl Dicker, Children Adrift: Addressing the Educational Needs 
of New York’s Foster Children, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005). 
 12. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. § 1414(d). An IEP is developed by the student’s IEP team, comprised of parents, 
teachers, a representative of the school district, outside consultants, and others including the 
child with disability when appropriate. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). IEPs are created annually and 
address the child’s present levels of functioning, annual academic goals, descriptions of special 
education services and supports to be provided to the child, and other accommodations. Id.  
§ 1414(d)(1)(A). 
 15. Id. § 1415(f). 
 16. Id. § 1415(g). 
 17. Id. § 1415(i)(2). 
 18. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005). 
 19. Id. at 62. 
 20. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006). 
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the Court determined that although parents who prevail in an IDEA 
action may recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the[ir] 
costs,”21 these costs do not include fees for the services of expert 
witnesses.22 
This Note argues that although individually the decisions of 
Schaffer and Arlington are justified, when considered together, they 
impose overwhelming burdens on parents without considering the 
realities of the litigation process. These cases departed from an 
established trend in IDEA litigation and signaled a retreat from 
previous efforts to increase the substantive and procedural rights of 
parents and their children.23 Part I provides an overview of the history 
of special education law and litigation in the United States, with 
emphasis on the enactment of the IDEA, its basic provisions, and 
major changes to it through a series of reauthorizations. Parts II and 
III describe the Supreme Court’s decisions in Schaffer and Arlington, 
respectively, and discuss the rationales and implications of each 
decision. Finally, Part IV examines the combined impact of the two 
cases on parents’ procedural due process rights in IDEA litigation 
and concludes that the Supreme Court has placed an unreasonable 
obstacle in the path of parents attempting to ensure their child 
receives a free and appropriate education. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE IDEA 
The IDEA embodies the legislative responses to a series of court 
cases. Litigation concerning the provision of special education 
services in the United States has encompassed three main phases over 
several decades. The first phase, emerging in the early 1970s, 
preceded the IDEA and centered on the establishment of the right to 
receive a publicly funded special education.24 This phase of litigation 
 
 21. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 22. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2457. 
 23. The one case that could be seen as an exception to this trend is Winkelman v. Parma 
City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007). In Winkelman, the Supreme Court determined that 
parents enjoy rights under the IDEA and therefore are entitled to prosecute claims on their 
own behalf. Id. at 2006. This case, however, does not represent a wholesale reversal of the 
Supreme Court’s trend of limiting parental rights. See infra note 146. 
 24. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the 
school board had an affirmative duty to provide handicapped children with education suited to 
their needs); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 
1971) (holding that Pennsylvania, having undertaken to provide a free public education to all its 
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led to legislative action codifying a right to special education in the 
form of the IDEA’s predecessor, the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975 (EHA).25 The second wave of litigation followed 
the enactment of the EHA,26 as the U.S. Supreme Court heard several 
landmark cases in the 1980s and 1990s concerning its 
implementation.27 These cases focused primarily on the nature of 
special education services children were entitled to receive, the 
responsibilities of school districts to parents, and the definition of a 
“free appropriate public education.”28 IDEA litigation entered a third 
phase in the 2000s, with the Supreme Court granting review of four 
IDEA cases within two years.29 Before these cases, the Supreme 
Court had not heard a significant case involving the IDEA in more 
than six years.30 The cases in this wave of litigation have not involved 
major substantive issues in the interpretation of the IDEA, but more 
technical, procedural issues.31 Although these issues may not generate 
much public interest, they have significant effects on the procedural 
rights of parents who challenge the school district’s provision of an 
appropriate public education for their special needs child. 
 
children, could not deny mentally retarded children access to that education appropriate to their 
capacities). 
 25. See S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975) (stating that the legislation “followed a series of 
landmark court cases establishing in law the right to education for all handicapped children”). 
 26. At the time, the IDEA was still titled the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. 
See infra Parts I.B–C. 
 27. See Andrew Trotter, IDEA Issues Getting Ear of High Court: Justices to Decide 
Whether Parents Allowed to Represent Their Children in Court Cases, 26 EDUCATION WEEK, 
Nov. 8, 2006, at 1, 23 (describing the cases of this second phase as “building blocks that still 
shape interpretations of the special education law”). 
 28. Id. 
 29. The Court decided Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005), and Arlington Cent. Sch. 
Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006), in the October 2005 Term. The Court followed with 
Winkelman v. Parma Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007) in the October 2006 Term, and granted 
certiorari in Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 127 S. Ct. 1393 (2007) for the October 2007 Term. 
 30. Trotter, supra note 27, at 23. Prior to Schaffer, the last Supreme Court case to focus on 
an issue involving the IDEA was Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999). 
See Trotter, supra note 27, at 23 (providing a timeline of all Supreme Court cases involving the 
IDEA). 
 31. See Trotter, supra note 27, at 23 (“By contrast, the latest IDEA cases in the high court 
have turned on ‘very technical, legalistic fine points that would be interesting [only] to 
litigators’ . . . . [They] do not present ‘the major issues people think of when they think of 
IDEA.’” (quoting Perry Zirkel, professor of education and law at Lehigh University, and Naomi 
Gittens, senior lawyer at the National School Boards Association)). 
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A. The Right to a Special Education 
Until the early 1970s, public school systems largely ignored the 
needs of special education students.32 In 1971, a landmark district 
court opinion in Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania,33 (PARC), held that “[h]aving undertaken to provide a 
free public education to all of its children . . . the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania may not deny any mentally retarded child access to a 
free public program of education and training.”34 This case established 
that the right to a free public education granted by statute to 
Pennsylvanian children must be provided to all children, including 
those with mental retardation or special needs.35 The court found that 
expert reports indicated all mentally retarded children could benefit 
from educational programs; therefore school districts must provide 
programs appropriate to each child’s individual capacities.36 Although 
the court did not specifically address equal protection claims, later 
courts used PARC to support decisions upholding the right to a 
special education on equal protection grounds.37 
PARC was followed one year later by Mills v. Board of 
Education,38 another district court decision finding a right to a public 
education for all special education students. In 1972, parents of seven 
students with disabilities filed an action after the District of 
Columbia’s public school system excluded their children without a 
hearing.39 The Mills court held that the denial of publicly funded 
educational opportunities to special needs children violates the Due 
Process Clause.40 The court also determined that procedural due 
process requires the children be provided a hearing prior to exclusion 
 
 32. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2000). 
 33. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
 34. Id. at 1259. 
 35. Id. at 1259–60. 
 36. Id. 
 37. E.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 493 (D. Minn. 1974) (citing PARC as support 
for the proposition that all special needs children can benefit from an education); see also 
NANCY LEE JONES, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: CONGRESSIONAL 
INTENT 4 (1995), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/1995/upl-meta-crs-
7997/95-669A_1995May19.pdf (“The House Report noted that since the decisions in PARC and 
Mills, ‘there have been 46 cases which are completed or still pending in 28 States.’ These 
decisions were described as ‘a nationwide movement in both State and Federal courts . . . .’” 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 3, 10 (1975))). 
 38. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 806 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 39. Id. at 868. 
 40. Id. at 875. 
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from the public schools or termination of special services.41 Finally, 
the court rejected the school district’s contention that it lacked money 
to provide this education, holding that insufficient funding cannot 
excuse a state’s duty to provide a publicly supported education for a 
specific group of students.42 PARC and Mills were the beginning of a 
national judicial movement that established a right to education for 
handicapped children and procedural due process rights when the 
provision of those educational services is changed or ended.43 
B. Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
After the advances made by PARC and Mills, lower court cases 
sprang up around the country, with litigants seeking improved 
educational opportunities for special needs children.44 These cases 
helped draw public attention to the unmet needs of special education 
students. Congress addressed the need for improved special 
education services as a result of four factors: the increased social 
awareness; the holdings in PARC and Mills, which mandated the 
education of children with disabilities as a constitutional requirement; 
an increased realization that state and local governments could not 
fund special education without federal assistance; and developing 
social science theories that educating children with disabilities could 
enable them to become more productive members of society.45 
Congress determined that ensuring educational opportunities for 
the handicapped was an essential element of the national policy of 
ensuring equality for all citizens as well as a way to promote the self-
sufficiency and economic contributions of individuals with 
disabilities.46 Additionally, congressional findings indicated that the 
needs of handicapped children were unmet because they received 
inappropriate services or were excluded entirely from school.47 
Because schools were not providing adequate services, parents often 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 876. 
 43. See S. REP. NO. 94-332, at 3 (1975) (“Since PARC and Mills there have been 46 cases 
which are completed or still pending in 28 States.”). 
 44. Id. This report was written during the committee meetings regarding the enactment of 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, less than three years after the decision in 
Mills. See id. 
 45. JONES, supra note 37, at 4. 
 46. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (Supp. IV 2004) (originally enacted as Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774). 
 47. EHA § 3(b)(2)–(5). 
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sought out other educational opportunities at great personal 
expense.48 These findings served as the basic impetus for subsequent 
congressional action. In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (EHA) “to assure that all handicapped 
children have available to them . . . free appropriate public 
education . . . to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of 
handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected, 
[and] to assist states and localities [in meeting this goal].”49 
Although the EHA did not explicitly set forth a substantive 
standard for the education of special needs children, it laid out 
extensive procedural requirements.50 The EHA required any state 
education agency receiving funds through the Act to establish and 
maintain procedures to protect the rights of children and their 
parents.51 The EHA granted parents the right to review all records 
regarding the education and placement of the child, allowed parents 
to receive an independent evaluation of the child’s capabilities, and 
required prior written notice whenever the school district intended to 
change or refused to change the placement of the child.52 
Additionally, the EHA gave parents the right to have information 
presented in their native language and the right to present any 
complaints related to the provision of the child’s FAPE to the school 
district.53 Further, parents were entitled to an impartial due process 
 
 48. Id. § 3(b)(6). 
 49. Id. § 3(c). 
 50. The statute defines a “free [and] appropriate education” as 
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public 
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the 
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, 
elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are 
provided in conformity with the individualized education program [required by the 
Act]. 
Id. § 4(a)(18). This is a standard that leaves much leeway to the states. Indeed, in the first 
Supreme Court case to interpret the EHA, the Court stated that the Act “leaves to the States 
the primary responsibility for developing and executing educational programs for handicapped 
children . . . [but] imposes significant requirements to be followed in the discharge of that 
responsibility.” Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982). Rowley determined the 
requirement to provide a FAPE is satisfied by providing personalized services and the Act 
“cannot be read as imposing any particular substantive education standard upon the States.” Id. 
at 200. The Court concluded the choice of educational theories and the manner in which 
appropriate education is provided should be left to the legislatures with minimal court oversight. 
Id. at 208. 
 51. EHA § 615(a). 
 52. Id. § 615 (b)(1). 
 53. Id. 
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hearing and could appeal the result of that hearing to the state’s 
educational agency.54 Parents had various rights at these hearings, 
including the right to counsel and experts, the right to present 
evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to receive written 
copies of the proceedings.55 Another important protection was the so-
called “stay-put” provision, which provided that “[d]uring the 
pendency of any proceedings . . . the child shall remain in the then 
current educational placement.”56 The stay-put provision prevented 
school districts from taking unilateral action to change a child’s 
placement. 
In 1982, the Supreme Court issued its first decision interpreting 
the EHA.57 After considering the many procedural safeguards, the 
Court concluded that the requirements of the Act were merely “to 
extend educational services first to those children who are receiving 
no education and second to those children who are receiving an 
‘inadequate education.’”58 The Act did not guarantee a substantive 
standard of education aside from the basic requirement that the 
services provide a sufficient benefit to enable the child to make 
educational progress.59 Instead, the Court determined the EHA 
evinced a primary intent to “require the States to adopt procedures 
which would result in individualized consideration of and instruction 
for each child.”60 The procedures of the IDEA ensure the substantive 
content of the Act will be met.61 This focus on the procedural 
safeguards of the EHA as the primary tool to enforce the substantive 
educational rights of special education students has continued 
throughout various amendments and reauthorizations as a primary 
 
 54. Id. § 615(b)(2)–615(c). 
 55. Id. § 615(d)–(e). 
 56. Id. § 615(e)(3). The 2004 amendments changed this provision by eliminating the 
requirement when the change of placement is in a disciplinary context. See infra Part IV.A. 
 57. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 58. Id. at 189. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. In Board of Eductaion v. Rowley, the Supreme Court articulated this point: 
When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied . . . are 
contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions 
contained in the Act, we think that the importance Congress attached to these 
procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. . . . We think that the congressional 
emphasis upon [procedural safeguards] . . . demonstrates the legislative conviction 
that adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure 
much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP. 
Id. at 205–06 (emphasis added). 
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focus of the IDEA, although later amendments blurred this sharp 
focus. 
C. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
In 1991, Congress changed the title of the EHA to the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act “to reflect an ‘individuals 
first’ approach.”62 The IDEA was reauthorized in 1997 and again in 
2004.63 Revisions to the Act continued to reflect congressional 
emphasis on procedural safeguards for the rights of parents and 
children. The IDEA requires each state educational agency to 
“establish and maintain procedures . . . to ensure that children with 
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards 
with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education.”64 
These procedural safeguards include those provided under the 
original EHA, but also include more specific and detailed 
requirements.65 For example, the specific contents of the prior written 
notice that schools must provide to parents before implementing or 
refusing to implement a change in the child’s educational plan are 
spelled out explicitly in the statute.66 The notice must describe the 
proposed action, detail the reasons for the proposal, and provide a 
statement of parents’ rights and sources to contact to obtain 
assistance in understanding their rights.67 In addition to providing 
more detail regarding previously granted rights, the IDEA provides 
additional safeguards not included in the original act, such as the right 
to mediation and the requirement that state educational agencies 
assist parents in filing complaints.68 
Congress designed the IDEA’s procedural safeguards to ensure 
that parents are aware of their due process rights and receive 
meaningful opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their 
 
 62. NANCY LEE JONES & RICHARD N. APLING, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUCATION ACT: STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND SELECTED ISSUES 2 n.6 (2002), available at 
usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/educ/topics/cr012503.pdf. 
 63. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 
111 Stat. 37; Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, 118 Stat. 2647. 
 64. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 65. Compare EHA, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615, 89 Stat. 773, 788–89 (1975), with IDEA, 20 
U.S.C. § 1415. 
 66. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. § 1415(b). 
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child’s education.69 In fact, without an express definition of FAPE, 
Congress appears to have intended for the IDEA’s procedural 
protections to serve as the primary method of enforcing the special 
needs child’s right to an education.70 Yet despite the fact that the 
procedural protections are an integral part of the act, the Supreme 
Court decisions in Schaffer and Arlington narrowed these protections 
and limited their effectiveness. 
II.  SCHAFFER V. WEAST 
A. Background 
The IDEA provides parents the right to seek an “impartial due 
process hearing” conducted by the state or local educational agency 
whenever they believe their child’s IEP is not appropriate.71 The 
decision at such a hearing is based on the substantive standard of 
whether the child is receiving a free and appropriate education.72 The 
IDEA addresses many procedural aspects of these due process 
hearings. It requires pleadings to contain specific elements,73 provides 
parties the right to counsel and to present evidence,74 and enables 
parents who are unsatisfied with the results of the hearing to bring 
actions in state or federal courts.75 The IDEA, however, does not 
speak directly to the issue of which party bears the burden of 
persuasion at due process hearings.76 
Courts interpreted this silence in different ways, as the circuits 
split on the issue of which party had the burden of proof at a hearing 
 
 69. Torrie v. Cwayna, 841 F. Supp. 1434, 1441 (W.D. Mich. 1994); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415 
(enumerating due process rights, including those for parents). 
 70. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982) (finding that Congress’s primary 
intent was to adopt procedures allowing for the individualized consideration of each child rather 
than to establish a standard for the education of special needs children). 
 71. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii) (requiring “a description of the nature of the problem” and “a 
proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and available”). 
 74. Id. § 1415(h)(1)–(2). 
 75. Id. § 1415(i)(2). 
 76. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 531 (2005). 
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challenging the adequacy of an IEP.77 In 2004, the Fourth Circuit 
reaffirmed its position placing the burden on the moving party with 
its decision in Schaffer, which highlighted the schism and opened the 
door for the Supreme Court to issue a conclusive answer.78 
B. The Schaffer Decision 
Brian Schaffer experienced learning disabilities and speech-
language impairments. He attended a private school until seventh 
grade, when school officials told his mother he needed a school that 
could better accommodate his needs.79 After conducting evaluations 
 
 77. The Second, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits found the burden of proof was properly 
placed on the schools to demonstrate that the IEP was providing a FAPE. See Walczak v. Fla. 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[S]chool authorities have the burden of 
supporting the proposed IEP”); E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 
1998) (“At the administrative level, the District clearly had the burden of proving that it had 
complied with the IDEA.”); Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (imposing the burden of proof 
at administrative hearings on school districts, at least for mainstreaming compliance issues, 
because of the statutory purpose of the IDEA and practical considerations regarding the school 
district’s informational advantage)); Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 
(9th Cir. 1994) (“The school clearly had the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that 
it complied with the IDEA.”). 
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits held that the burden of proof was 
properly imposed on the party challenging the IEP in a due process hearing, typically the 
parents. See Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding the 
burden rests with the “complaining party”); Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1466 (6th Cir. 
1990) (declining to depart from the “traditional” burden of proof); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 
No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding the burden rests with the party attacking the 
IEP); Speilberg v. Henrico County Pub. Sch., 853 F.2d 256, 58 n.2 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding the 
burden is on the party challenging the state administrative decision); Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. 
Dist. V. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding the burden is on the 
party attacking the IEP). 
The D.C. Circuit’s stance was unclear. In 1985, the court placed the burden of proof on 
the school districts when there were procedural deficiencies in an IEP. McKenzie v. Smith, 771 
F.2d 1527, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Three years later, however, the D.C. Circuit again considered 
the issue and interpreted its previous decision as placing the burden on party bringing suit—the 
party that lost the administrative hearing. Kerhmam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). In the earlier case, the school district had lost in the administrative hearing below, but in 
the later case the burden of proof was on the parents because they were attempting to overturn 
the administrative decision. Id. 
State courts also joined the fray, increasing the confusion. E.g., Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 
560 A.2d 1180, 1188 (N.J. 1989) (placing the burden of proof on the school districts because of 
their expertise and informational advantages over parents). 
 78. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 452–53 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing the circuit split on 
the burden of proof issue before placing the burden of proof on the moving party in IDEA 
cases—typically the parent). 
 79. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. at 533. 
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and IEP team meetings, the school district offered Brian placement in 
either of two middle schools.80 Brian’s parents, however, enrolled 
Brian in another private school, believing that he needed more 
intensive services and smaller classes. They then sought compensation 
for the cost of his private education in a due process hearing 
challenging the adequacy of the IEP.81 Because the administrative law 
judge determined the evidence was “truly in ‘equipoise,’” at the due 
process hearing,82 the assignment of the burden of proof was 
determinative of the outcome of the case. 
The IDEA does not assign the burden of persuasion; thus, the 
Supreme Court began with the default rule, placing the burden on 
plaintiffs.83 Because decisions placing the burden of persuasion on the 
opposing party from the outset of litigation are very rare, the Court 
concluded that without a persuasive reason to believe Congress 
intended the burden to shift in IDEA cases, the burden would lie with 
the plaintiffs.84 The Supreme Court found that a “great deal is already 
spent on the administration” of the IDEA, and thus, any marginal 
dollars should be spent on the provision of educational services, not 
litigation.85 Assuming that an IEP is invalid unless a school district 
proves otherwise—the effect of placing the burden of persuasion on 
school districts—would counteract the presumptions of the IDEA, 
which relies heavily upon school districts’ expertise in order to meet 
its goals.86 As an example of this presumption, the Court cited the 
“stay-put” provision, which requires a student to remain in the “then-
current educational placement” during a hearing, because a child’s 
current educational placement is usually the one designated by the 
school district.87 
The Court found the parents’ most plausible argument was a 
fairness argument: the school districts have an advantage in 
information, expertise, and resources and therefore should bear the 
burden of persuasion.88 It concluded, however, that Congress already 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 534. 
 84. Id. at 534–35. 
 85. Id. at 535. 
 86. Id. at 535–36. 
 87. Id. at 536. 
 88. Id. 
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addressed this informational advantage when it created safeguards for 
the procedural rights of parents, requiring schools to share all 
information with them.89 Accordingly, the Court held that the party 
seeking relief properly bears the burden of proof at administrative 
hearings under the IDEA.90 
C. Implications 
Although many parents, advocates, and their attorneys argue 
that Schaffer “risks inviting school districts to ignore or undermine 
[parents’] rights and deprive their children of a free appropriate 
public education,”91 once the realities of the educational laws and 
litigation process are considered, the decision will likely not have 
much effect on IDEA litigation in all but one area—the need for 
expert witnesses. First, the outcome of very few cases will actually 
depend on which party bears the burden of persuasion because very 
few cases are truly in equipoise after the presentation of evidence.92 
Additionally, Schaffer will not have an effect on IDEA litigation in all 
jurisdictions. Schaffer left states the option of legislatively placing the 
burden of proof on school districts.93 Several states already have laws 
or regulations which place the burden of proof on the school 
districts.94 Moreover, the decision will not affect litigation in 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 536–37. 
 91. Amicus Committee Statement of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, supra note 8. 
 92. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 535 (“In truth . . . very few cases will be in evidentiary 
equipoise.”); see also Peter W.D. Wright, How Will Schaffer v. Weast Affect You? (2005) 
(unpublished manuscript at 7), available at http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/art/schaffer.impact. 
pwright.pdf (“In general, what controls outcome is not the facts nor the law. It comes down to 
one thing: Does the Hearing Officer/Administrative Law Judge want to rule in your 
favor? . . . It is the human emotions of the HO/ALJ and your ability to influence their beliefs 
and emotions [that] will take you into the end zone, without regard to which side has the burden 
of proof.”). This conclusion was supported by an ALJ in an unrelated IDEA hearing. He stated, 
“while the parties seemed to place great emphasis on the issue of burden of proof, my decision 
would remain unchanged even if I had determined that the [school district] carried the burden.” 
Waller v. Bd. of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 2d 531, 538 (D. Md. 2002) (quoting the ALJ decision). 
 93. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. 537 (“Finally, respondents and several States urge us to decide that 
States may, if they wish, override the default rule and put the burden always on the school 
district. Several States have laws or regulations purporting to do so, at least under some 
circumstances. Because no such law or regulation exists in Maryland, we need not decide this 
issue today.”). 
 94. States that statutorily placed the burden of proof on the school district are Alabama, 
Alaska, Connecticut, Washington, D.C., Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, and 
West Virginia. Wright, supra note 92, at 1, 3–4; e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.090(7) (2003); 
MINN. STAT. § 125A.091(16) (2007). 
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jurisdictions that already placed the burden of proof on the parents 
before Schaffer.95 Thus, the decision only affects about half the 
states.96 
Schaffer may even benefit parents in one type of IDEA hearing. 
Previously, when school districts unilaterally changed a child’s IEP, 
parents had the choice of either accepting that IEP or requesting a 
hearing. When parents did request a hearing, administrative law 
judges often assumed that the parents were the party seeking change 
because they had requested the hearing—even when the school 
district was the one attempting to change the IEP.97 This led to the 
placement of the burden of persuasion on parents too frequently. 
After Schaffer, when a school district unilaterally attempts to change 
an IEP, courts consider it the party “seeking relief,” and therefore the 
district bears the burden of proof.98 
A final reason that Schaffer, alone, is unlikely to have a large 
impact is that attorneys do not tend to exert less effort in litigation 
simply because their party does not bear the burden of proof. It is 
always in advocates’ interest to present their best possible case in 
hopes of prevailing.99 Thus, the hearing process is unlikely to change 
solely because parents bear the burden of proof as attorneys will 
continue to present as compelling a case as possible. Before Schaffer, 
plaintiffs often requested to present their cases first, even when they 
did not bear the burden of proof; if school districts were required to 
present first, hearings would take much longer because districts would 
have to anticipate plaintiffs’ cases.100 
 
 95. According to Wright’s research, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits had all previously allocated the burden of proof to the parents. Wright, supra note 92, 
at 3. Thus, the states that will not be affected by Schaffer are Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Wright, supra note 92, at 3–4; 
see also supra note 77. 
 96. Wright, supra note 92, at 3–4. 
 97. Id. at 5. 
 98. See id. at 5 (“[Previously,] parents had the burden of proving that the new proposed 
IEP was not appropriate. The decision in Schaffer changed this.”); see also Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 
532 (stating that school districts may seek IDEA hearings and thus bear the burden of 
persuasion “if they wish to change an existing IEP but the parents do not consent, or if parents 
refuse to allow their child to be evaluated”). 
 99. See Wright, supra note 92, at 6 (“I always go first. This gives me control over the order 
of witnesses, and allows me to lay out the case and theme of the case in the manner I prefer.”). 
 100. See Wright, supra note 92, at 6–7 (describing hearings in other jurisdictions—which did 
not previously assign the burden of proof to the parents—where Wright asked to go first even 
when the school district had the burden of proof). When hearing officers refused to allow 
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Although it imposes a legal burden on the parents, Schaffer is 
unlikely to have much effect on the way litigation actually progresses 
in all but one area: expert witness testimony. Schaffer places a 
substantial burden on parents by increasing their need for expert 
witnesses. Placing the burden of persuasion on parents in IDEA 
proceedings requires parents to retain their own experts to counter 
the presumption that a child’s IEP is appropriate. Because parents 
have the burden of proving the inappropriateness of the IEP—
formulated by the school district’s experienced teachers and special 
education experts—they will often have to provide exceptionally 
qualified and credible medical or education experts in order to prevail 
at a FAPE hearing.101 
As school districts typically have experts on staff in the form of 
special education teachers, child psychologists, and educational 
specialists,102 they have ready access to experts who will support the 
IEP provided for the child without incurring exorbitant fees for the 
retention of expert witnesses. Additionally, school districts have much 
more experience in creating IEPs and educating special needs 
children. It may be very difficult for parents to overcome judicial 
deference to the school districts, and indeed may be a nearly 
impossible task for parents to accomplish without the testimony of 
 
Wright to present his case first, it resulted in much longer trials because the school district had 
to anticipate every issue that could arise in the parents’ case and therefore attempted to cover 
every possible issue. Id. 
 101. See Brief for The Council of Parent Attorneys & Advocates as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 3, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006) (No. 
05-18) (“Because, as this Court recently ruled [in Schaffer], parents bear the burden of proving 
that an appropriate IEP is not being provided for their children, and because the presentation of 
expert evidence is an indispensable part of the process of proof, . . . the Court should not accord 
a prevailing party an empty victory by forcing the parents to bear the costs of experts, without 
whose help, they would not have obtained a free appropriate public education for their 
children.”); Kathryn H. Crary, Comment, Necessary Expertise: Allowing Parents to Recover 
Expert Witness Fees Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 
967, 968 (2004) (“[T]he use of expert witnesses in these IDEA actions is both necessary and 
costly. Before filing suit against a school district, special education attorneys recommend that 
parents obtain ‘strong, believable’ expert witness testimony, because such testimony . . . is 
generally necessary to rebut a school district’s assertion that a child is receiving a ‘free 
appropriate public education.’”). 
 102. For example, school districts often have autism specialists, program specialists, 
inclusion specialists, occupational therapists, speech pathologists, and physical therapists, to 
name a few of the many possible educational specialists. 
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their own expert witnesses.103 It was exactly this aspect of IDEA 
litigation the Supreme Court addressed next. 
III.  ARLINGTON V. MURPHY 
A. Background 
Although the amendments to the IDEA allow parents who 
prevail in an action against a school district to recover attorneys’ 
fees,104 the original version of the Act did not include any such 
provision.105 Parents, however, often brought actions for recovery of 
costs in IDEA cases under other statutes that related to disabled 
children’s right to a FAPE and provided for attorneys’ fees for 
prevailing plaintiffs.106 In 1984, the Supreme Court foreclosed that 
possibility by holding explicitly that parents could not use other 
statutes to recover attorneys’ fees under the IDEA.107 In response, 
Congress enacted the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 
1986, which made attorneys’ fees recoverable by prevailing parents.108 
Congress applied the statute retroactively, demonstrating its 
commitment to the protection of parents’ procedural rights in IDEA 
litigation by allowing them to recover even expenses previously 
incurred.109 
The IDEA provides courts discretion to “award reasonable 
attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to parents of a child with a 
 
 103. See Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, SPECIAL EDUCATOR 
(LRP Publ’ns, Alexandria, Va.), July 21, 2006, at 4 (“With rare exception, parents must offer the 
testimony of expert witnesses in order to prevail in administrative due process proceedings.” 
(quoting attorney Steven Wyner)). 
 104. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 105. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA), Pub. L. 94-142  
§ 3(b)(2)–(5), 89 Stat. 774. 
 106. See Stefan R. Hanson, Buckhannon, Special Education Disputes, and Attorneys’ Fees: 
Time for a Congressional Response Again, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 519, 531–32 (remarking that 
although the EHA had no attorneys’ fees provision, parents often recovered their fees under 
other statutes). The most frequently used statutes were the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). See Crary, supra note 101, at 973. 
 107. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1015 (1984). 
 108. Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372 § 2(B), 100 Stat. 
796. 
 109. Id. § 5; see also Mitchell L. Yell & Christine A. Espin, The Handicapped Children’s 
Protection Act of 1986: Time to Pay the Piper?, 56 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 396, 401–02 (1990) 
(discussing the effect of retroactive application). 
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disability when they are the prevailing party.110 This language is 
similar to attorneys’ fees provisions in other federal statutes.111 Yet 
the IDEA is even more detailed, including specific fee-calculating 
provisions prohibiting the use of any bonus or multiplier, as well as 
the recovery of fees or costs for certain services.112 Notably absent 
from the IDEA, however, is any provision for the recovery of fees 
paid to expert witnesses during the litigation. When courts considered 
actions for the recovery of costs under the IDEA, the attorneys’ fees 
provision gave rise to a division among the circuits as to whether the 
provision included expert fees in addition to attorneys’ fees.113 The 
Second Circuit joined the debate in 2005, allowing prevailing parents 
to recover expert fees,114 and gave the Supreme Court its second 
opportunity to consider a technical, procedural IDEA issue during 
the 2005–2006 term. 
B. The Arlington Decision 
Pearl and Theodore Murphy brought a suit seeking to compel 
the Arlington Central School District Board of Education to pay 
private school tuition for their special needs son, Joseph.115 
Throughout the proceedings, the Murphys were assisted by an 
education consultant whom they paid $29,350 for her services.116 Upon 
prevailing on their substantive claims, the Murphys then sought to 
recover the fees they paid to their expert.117 
 
 110. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 111. See Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 593 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(comparing the IDEA attorneys’ fees provision to 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 
 112. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C)–(D). 
 113. Compare Arons v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that 
although non-lawyers could not recover attorneys’ fees despite acting as counsel, experts fell 
within the confines of the statute), and Brillon v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 274 F. Supp. 2d 864, 
872 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that expert fees are recoverable in IDEA actions), and B.D. v. 
DeBuono, 177 F. Supp. 2d 201, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that Congress intended expert fees 
to be recoverable under the IDEA), with Goldring ex rel. Anderson v. District of Columbia, 416 
F.3d 70, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that expert fees are not recoverable in IDEA actions), and 
T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist., No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 482 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that expert fees 
are not recoverable because there is no explicit authorization in the IDEA), and Neosho R-V 
Sch. Dist. v. Clarke, 315 F.2d 1022, 1033 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that expert fees are not 
recoverable in IDEA actions), and Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified Sch. Dist., 2004 WL 4999156, 
at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004) (holding that expert fees not recoverable). 
 114. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 332, 339 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 115. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2006). 
 116. Id. at 2458. 
 117. Id. at 2457–58. 
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Basing its analysis on the premise that Congress enacted the 
IDEA under its Spending Clause authority, the Supreme Court 
determined the Act does not permit prevailing parents to recover fees 
paid to their expert witnesses.118 When imposing conditions on 
disbursements of federal money to the states pursuant to its spending 
clause authority, Congress must set out the conditions attached to 
these grants unambiguously, and states must accept such conditions 
voluntarily and knowingly.119 The Court concluded that the language 
of the IDEA attorneys’ fees provision does not provide states with 
any warning that expert fees may be included within the costs 
recoverable by the parents, but merely adds attorneys’ fees to the 
types of costs that are typically recoverable in litigation.120 Moreover, 
because the IDEA contains very detailed provisions regarding 
specific fees that are and are not recoverable as part of attorneys’ 
fees, the absence of any similar provisions pertaining to expert fees 
indicates they are not authorized by the statute.121 Absent language in 
the statute requiring the recovery of expert fees, the Court 
determined states do not have the necessary clear notice required to 
attach a condition to the grant of federal money.122 
The Court also analogized to cases regarding Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(d), which authorizes the award of costs to a 
prevailing party, and the fee-shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
governing civil rights actions.123 In such cases, the Court had 
determined that nearly identical language in attorneys’ fees 
provisions did not include expert fees absent express authorization by 
Congress.124 
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that reimbursing 
prevailing parents for expert fees furthers the IDEA’s primary goal. 
It determined that the goal of providing a free appropriate education 
did not prevail over other considerations, such as a school district’s 
 
 118. Id. at 2458–64. 
 119. Id. at 2459. 
 120. Id. at 2459–60. For a list of typically recoverable costs, see 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000). 
 121. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2460–61. 
 122. Id.; see also W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 89 & n.4 (1991) (drawing the 
same conclusion and listing thirty-five federal statutes that explicitly include expert fees in 
addition to attorneys’ fees). 
 123. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 124. Id. (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439 (1987) and 
Casey, 499 U.S. at 102). 
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monetary concerns.125 In light of the statute’s plain text, the Court 
found the legislative intent that expert fees be recoverable by 
prevailing parties unpersuasive.126 Accordingly, the Court determined 
that prevailing parents could not recover fees paid to expert witnesses 
and consultants as part of their costs in IDEA actions.127 
IV.  UNDERMINING THE IDEA 
Although Arlington appears to be in line with previous Spending 
Clause cases requiring clear notice of recoverable costs,128 and 
Schaffer is consistent with other cases placing the burden of 
persuasion on the party seeking relief,129 the impacts of the decisions 
are compounded significantly when the cases are evaluated together. 
The decisions have a combined effect that undermines the goals of 
the IDEA and the rationale used by the Supreme Court in the 
decisions themselves. First, Arlington and Schaffer, along with the 
2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, represent a distinct departure 
from prior trends in the Act and its supporting body of case law, 
which consistently indicated increasing support for rights of parents 
and students. Second, the decision in Arlington undermines the 
Supreme Court’s rationale for placing the burden of proof upon 
parents in Schaffer. Finally, the decisions ignore the realities of the 
litigation process and the characteristics of many special education 
parents by imposing unreasonable obstacles in the way of parents’ 
attempts to exercise their due process rights. 
A. Bucking the Trend 
Prior to 2004, congressional amendments to the IDEA and 
judicial interpretations of the Act established a trend of increasing 
 
 125. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 126. Id. The House Report stated, “The conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as 
part of the costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable 
costs of any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the . . . 
case.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986). 
 127. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2457–58. 
 128. Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, supra note 103, at 4; see also 
Casey, 499 U.S. at 102 (finding that expert fees are not recoverable in a § 1988 action); Crawford 
Fitting, 482 U.S. at 439 (finding that expert fees are not recoverable absent explicit 
authorization). 
 129. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999) (placing the 
burden on the party seeking relief); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999) (same); St. 
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (same). 
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support for the rights of parents and students, substantively and 
especially procedurally. These amendments to the IDEA provided 
increasing amounts of money for special education and significantly 
expanded the group of students eligible for services under the Act by 
including additional disabilities.130 Additionally, the Act focused on 
increasing the services available to preschool-aged children in an 
attempt to keep them from falling too far behind before beginning 
school.131 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the IDEA prior to 2004 
consistently supported the increasing scope of substantive and 
procedural rights of children with disabilities—and their parents as 
well. In 1984, the Supreme Court required a school district to provide 
services for clean intermittent catheterization during the school day 
to a student with disabilities as a “related service” in order to allow 
her to attend school.132 One year later, the Court determined that 
parents are entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition and 
expenses even when they take unilateral action to place their child in 
that school—technically violating the stay-put provision during a 
dispute with the school district—if a court later determines the 
parents’ placement was appropriate and the school district’s 
placement was inappropriate.133 In its next IDEA case, the Court 
decided that as a result of the stay-put provision and the strong 
presumption in favor of keeping children in their current educational 
placements, a school district may not suspend or expel a violent or 
disruptive child with disabilities without following the due process 
procedures of the IDEA.134 
Other Supreme Court decisions determined that parents may be 
reimbursed for the costs of unilaterally placing a child with disabilities 
in a private school that provides an appropriate education even when 
 
 130. See RICHARD N. APLING, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
(IDEA): CURRENT FUNDING TRENDS 1 (2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=key_workplace (stating that since 1995, “overall 
IDEA funding has increased by nearly 250%, from $3.2 billion to $11.2 billion” due to increases 
in the number of children served). 
 131. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 100 Stat. 
1145 (expanding preschool programs significantly and emphasizing the early education focus of 
the act). 
 132. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 893 (1984). 
 133. Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1985). 
 134. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 (1988). This protection was later removed by Congress 
in the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA. See infra text accompanying note 142. 
04__THOMASON.DOC 12/6/2007  8:54:11 AM 
478 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:457 
the school is not approved by the state135 and that children entitled to 
IDEA services may be provided those public services by sectarian 
schools without violating the First Amendment.136 In its last IDEA 
case before Schaffer, the Supreme Court determined that school 
districts must provide one-on-one nursing services to students with 
serious disabilities if those services are necessary in order to allow 
them to attend school.137 With one exception, every time the Supreme 
Court considered an IDEA issue, it found in favor of the parents and 
students with disabilities, protecting rights by increasing the 
responsibilities of the school districts.138 The sole exception is Smith v. 
Robinson,139 which Congress overturned almost immediately.140 Lower 
courts followed the example of the Supreme Court, consistently 
increasing the substantive and procedural rights of parents and 
children.141 These decisions, along with the series of amendments to 
the IDEA, evinced a trend of increasing substantive and procedural 
rights afforded to children with disabilities and their parents. 
The tide turned in 2004. The reauthorization of the IDEA that 
year displayed a different focus, as Congress cut back on many of the 
procedural safeguards that had been the cornerstones of the act. The 
reauthorized version of the IDEA narrowed the scope of the stay-put 
provision significantly by giving the local education agency the 
authority to remove a child to an interim placement upon the 
determination that the child would be a danger in the current 
educational setting.142 This change to the stay-put provision 
specifically contradicts the holding in Honig v. Doe, which found that 
the provision prohibits school districts from removing children from 
school simply by claiming they are dangerous.143 Another amendment 
 
 135. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 9 (1993). 
 136. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993). 
 137. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 68, 79 (1999). 
 138. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text. 
 139. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1015 (1984). 
 140. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
 141. See, e.g., Mackey v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.3d 158, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2004) (allowing parents 
to recover the costs of tuition because to do otherwise would be inherently unfair); Oberti v. Bd. 
of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that children must be placed in a regular 
classroom with support services and modifications whenever there is any way they can be 
educated satisfactorily, and if not that efforts must be made to include the children whenever 
possible); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3068 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 
2005) (allowing parents to recover fees despite prevailing on only some issues at the hearing). 
 142. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)–(4) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 143. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323–24 (1988). 
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in the reauthorized Act allows school districts to recover attorneys’ 
fees from parents upon prevailing in IDEA actions.144 School districts 
may recover fees whenever a parent’s complaint is frivolous, 
unreasonable, presented for an improper purpose, or intended to 
needlessly delay or increase the cost of litigation.145 Even though 
school districts may not recover without “bad faith” actions on the 
part of the parents, this is a significant change in the IDEA, which 
had always focused on protecting the rights of the parents and 
students, not the districts. 
After these revisions took effect on July 1, 2005, the Supreme 
Court issued its decisions in Schaffer and Arlington, the first IDEA 
decisions to come down in favor of school districts by further 
narrowing the procedural safeguards and rights of parents. It is 
unclear whether the Supreme Court will continue this trend limiting 
the procedural safeguards for parents in IDEA litigation.146 
B. Undermining Schaffer’s Rationale 
1. The Insurmountable Burden of Proof.  In its Schaffer opinion, 
the Supreme Court cited the many procedural safeguards of the 
IDEA as a major factor in its decision to impose the burden of 
 
 144. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)–(III) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 145. Id. 
 146. As noted, Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007), may at first 
glance appear to go against the trend of limiting procedural rights. See supra note 23. The 
Court’s opinion in Winkelman, however, focused primarily on a textual, plain meaning reading 
of the IDEA, stating that it “defines one of its purposes as seeking ‘to ensure that the rights of 
children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.’” Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 
2002 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2004)). Thus, although the Court found in 
favor of the parents in this case, rather than the school district as in Schaffer and Arlington, the 
decision gives no indication that the court will do so in regards to any future procedural rights 
which are subject to interpretation rather than explicitly stated in the IDEA. Moreover, as 
attorneys’ fees are recoverable under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), Winkelman 
does not provide a new economic benefit to parents. Parents with meritorious claims, even those 
with low income levels, would likely be able to find counsel to represent their interests on a 
contingency basis due to the ability to recover their fees upon success. Thus, although decided in 
favor of the parents, Winkelman remains a hollow victory as it does nothing to reduce the 
difficulties parents face following Schaffer and Arlington because they still must carry the 
burden of persuasion at IDEA hearings while being unable to recover expert fees. 
The Supreme Court will have yet another opportunity to consider an IDEA issue in its 
fall 2007 term. In Board of Education v. Tom F., the Court will decide whether parents may be 
reimbursed for tuition when students receive special education services from private schools 
even if the students never received services from public schools. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on February 26, 2007. 127 S. Ct. 1393 (2007). 
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persuasion on the party seeking relief in IDEA litigation.147 The Court 
reasoned that carrying the burden of proof will not harm parents 
because their rights are sufficiently protected by these procedural 
safeguards.148 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the safeguards 
are sufficient to eliminate the school district’s informational 
advantage.149 When examined in light of its subsequent decision in 
Arlington, however, the individual safeguards cited by the Court will 
not adequately protect parent or student rights in IDEA actions. 
The first safeguard cited by the Supreme Court is the right of 
parents to have expert witnesses and opinions at IDEA hearings. The 
provisions of the IDEA and federal regulations explicitly 
acknowledge the necessity of expert witnesses by providing parents 
the right to an “independent educational evaluation of the[ir] child” 
at public expense.150 The Court in Schaffer emphasized this provision, 
saying the 
IDEA thus ensures parents access to an expert who can evaluate all 
the materials that the school must make available, and who can give 
an independent opinion. They are not left to challenge the 
government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary 
evidence, or without an expert with the firepower to match the 
opposition.151 
The Court thus recognized the necessity of parents having their own 
expert to match the school district. Yet, despite stressing the 
importance of expert evidence, the Supreme Court seven months 
later in Arlington essentially took away any practical access to this 
right by eliminating all possibilities of financial assistance for parents 
who retain experts. Parents are unlikely to find an expert who will 
work without the possibility of recovering fees from the school district 
upon prevailing. This decision effectively restricts the possibility of 
 
 147. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 534–35 (2005). 
 148. Id.; see Susan Boswell, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds School Districts in Special Ed Case, 
ASHA LEADER, Dec. 27, 2005, http://www.asha.org/about/publications/leader-online/archives/ 
2005/051227/051227c.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007) (stating that the “[t]he ruling 
recognizes . . . that recent IDEA reauthorizations have strengthened procedural safeguards” 
because parents may have experts to match the school districts’ experts). 
 149. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 536. 
 150. Id. For the IDEA’s statutory provision of this expert evaluation, see IDEA, 20 U.S.C.  
§ 1415(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2004). The Code of Federal Regulations provides guidelines to assist 
states in their interpretations of the right to an expert evaluation. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) 
(2007). 
 151. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 536. 
04__THOMASON.DOC 12/6/2007  8:54:11 AM 
2007] IDEA LITIGATION 481 
retaining experts—and therefore bringing cases—to only wealthy 
parents. Thus, although Schaffer stresses the opportunities for parents 
to use experts as a reason to place the burden of persuasion on 
parents at IDEA hearings, Arlington essentially eliminates any 
feasible chance of realizing that opportunity. 
Another procedural safeguard emphasized in Schaffer was the 
attorneys’ fees provision. The Court stated, “[f]inally, and perhaps 
most importantly, parents may recover attorneys’ fees if they 
prevail.”152 At the time of this statement, many courts around the 
country included expert fees in the attorneys’ fees parents could 
recover upon prevailing. The holding in Arlington, which eliminated 
that possibility, therefore significantly changed and reduced the scope 
of the safeguard on which the Court placed the most importance in its 
decision to shift the burden of proof to parents in IDEA litigation. 
2. Undermining Congressional Intent.  In addition to 
undermining parents’ ability to overcome imposition of the burden of 
proof, the Arlington decision contradicts congressional intent, 
another rationale used to impose the burden of proof on parents in 
Schaffer. The Schaffer Court reasoned that Congress already had 
considered the many disadvantages parents face when challenging 
school districts in IDEA actions and included sufficient procedural 
protections in drafting the Act to compensate for those 
disadvantages.153 The Court’s decision in Arlington, however, 
contradicts one of the protections Congress appears to have intended 
to include when drafting the IDEA. Two different versions of the bill 
were introduced in the Senate as it considered amending the EHA to 
provide for the recovery of attorneys’ fees by prevailing parents. The 
first provided that “the court, in its discretion, may award a 
reasonable attorney’s fee [as part of the costs]” to prevailing 
parents.154 The second version of the bill would have provided for the 
recovery of “a reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable witness fees, and 
other reasonable expenses of the civil action” to the prevailing 
parents, but also would have set a cap on the total costs that could be 
recovered.155 Although the record shows no objections to the types of 
costs included in the second bill, there were several objections to the 
 
 152. Id. at 537. 
 153. Id. at 536–37. 
 154. S. REP. NO. 99-112, at 15 (1985). 
 155. Id. at 7. 
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cap on the amount of recoverable fees.156 This conflict led to the 
introduction of an alternative, compromise bill, which granted courts 
discretion to provide a “reasonable attorney’s fee in addition to the 
costs” to prevailing parents. When explaining the effect this version 
of the bill would have, Senator Lowell Weicker stated that the intent 
of the Senate was to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees, necessary 
expert witness fees, and other reasonable expenses which were 
necessary for parents to vindicate their claim to a free appropriate 
public education for their handicapped child.”157 There was no 
opposition to this statement, and the bill passed in the Senate.158 
Similar intent to include expert fees was revealed in the House of 
Representatives when a new version of the bill was introduced 
allowing for the recovery of “reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses and 
costs.”159 The House Report stated, “[t]he phrase ‘expenses and costs’ 
includes expenses of expert witnesses . . . .”160 
These statements indicate each chamber’s intent to provide for 
the recovery of expert fees in addition to attorneys’ fees. In the joint 
conference on the final version of the bill, legislators gave courts 
discretion to “award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.”161 
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference 
said: 
The conferees intend that the term “attorneys’ fees as part of the 
costs” include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and 
the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is found to be 
necessary for the preparation of the parent or guardian’s case in the 
action or proceeding, as well as traditional costs incurred in the 
course of litigating a case.162 
When the legislative history is considered, it appears that 
Congress intended to provide for the inclusion of expert and 
attorneys’ fees in the amendment to the EHA. Thus, Arlington 
 
 156. See id. Significantly, this objection to a cap on the amount of recoverable fees again 
demonstrates Congress’s commitment to protecting the interests of children with disabilities and 
their parents by providing the opportunity for parents to recover all of their expenses, not only a 
portion. 
 157. 131 CONG. REC. 21390 (statement of Sen. Weicker) (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. at 21390–93. 
 159. H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 1, 5 (1985). 
 160. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 161. H.R. REP. NO. 99-687 (1986). 
 162. Id. (emphasis added). 
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eliminates a substantial procedural safeguard Congress intended to 
include in the IDEA to protect parents involved in litigation with 
school districts, which have significantly greater information, 
resources, and expertise. By reducing parents’ available procedural 
safeguards, the Court’s decision in Arlington undermines the 
rationale in Schaffer, which found the expansive procedural 
safeguards in the IDEA justified the imposition of the burden of 
proof on parents in IDEA litigation. 
C. The Combined Effect of the Decisions in Light of Demographic 
Information 
The effect of the decisions in Schaffer and Arlington will have a 
significant impact on parents of children with disabilities. As 
discussed in Part II.D, the primary way Schaffer will affect IDEA 
litigation is by increasing parents’ need for expert witnesses. Once 
parents have the burden of proof at a hearing—making the use of 
experts a practical necessity in order to overcome the presumption 
that the school district’s IEP is correct—not allowing parents to 
recover fees paid to experts severely limits their ability to bring an 
action. 
The impact of these decisions becomes even more significant 
upon consideration of the demographics of special education 
students’ households. Although the employment patterns of parents 
of special education students are essentially the same as parents of 
non–special needs children, they tend to earn less.163 More than one-
third of students with disabilities live in households with annual 
incomes less than $25,000, and one-quarter of students with 
disabilities live in poverty.164 Additionally, only half as many children 
with disabilities live in households with more than $75,000 in annual 
income as do other children.165 This likely occurs because both 
mothers and fathers of students with disabilities tend to have much 
lower levels of education than the parents of other students.166 Finally, 
approximately one-quarter of students with disabilities receive money 
 
 163. MARY WAGNER ET AL., THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 
AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS 24, 28 (2002), available at http://www.seels.net/designdocs/SEELS_ 
Children_We_Serve_Report.pdf. 
 164. Id. at 28. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 23. 
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from at least one governmental benefit program, such as Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families, food stamps, or Supplemental 
Security Income.167 Overall, although the parents of children with 
disabilities are as likely to work as parents of typical children, they 
are much more likely to have a very low income level, live in poverty, 
and receive federal assistance.168 
This demographic information illustrates that the majority of 
parents with children in special education do not have sufficient 
income to hire expert witnesses necessary to carry their burden of 
proof at IDEA hearings. Given the high average cost of expert 
services,169 it is not only these low-income families burdened by the 
change in the IDEA procedural law, but also the many middle-class 
families who do not have disposable income on hand to hire an 
expert. Moreover, parents of special education students are especially 
likely to need expert advice and consultation throughout the process 
due to their lower-than-average levels of education. It is thus the 
group most likely to need assistance in IDEA hearings that suffers 
the greatest harm as a result of Arlington.170 
In contrast to the significant burden it can impose on parents’ 
finances, litigating due process complaints is not the large drain on 
school districts’ educational budgets that the Court seems to 
suggest.171 Although attorneys for school districts proclaim that the 
decision “will save the taxpayers a lot of money,”172 parents actually 
request civil hearings very rarely. Only five out of every ten thousand 
children who receive special education services under the IDEA 
 
 167. Id. at 30. 
 168. Id. at 47. 
 169. See Crary, supra note 101, at 968 (“[T]he use of expert witnesses in these IDEA actions 
is both necessary and costly.”). For example, in Arlington, parents sought reimbursement for 
$29,350 of expert fees and services. Arlington v. Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 
2458 (2006). 
 170. See Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, supra note 103, at 4 
(“[T]he ruling will most impact financially disadvantaged families who may be unable to find 
experts who don’t seek to recover fees.”). 
 171. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 535 (2005) (“Litigating a due 
process complaint is an expensive affair, costing schools approximately $8,000-to-$12,000 per 
hearing.”). Although these cost figures may be accurate, these hearings occur very infrequently. 
See infra text accompanying notes 173–74. 
 172. Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, supra note 103, at 4 (quoting 
Ron Wenkart, an attorney for the Orange County Office of Education in Costa Mesa, CA). 
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request due process hearings.173 In fact, 94 percent of all school 
districts have never had a single IDEA hearing, and the total amount 
spent on all IDEA disputes represents only 0.3 percent of special 
education spending.174 Thus, evidence suggests additional costs to 
school districts from reimbursing expert fees will accrue very rarely, 
whereas “[w]ithout the ability to recover their expert witness fees, few 
parents could afford to exercise their constitutional and IDEA rights 
to challenge [the] denial of FAPE to their children by school 
districts.”175 
CONCLUSION 
Individually rational decisions in Schaffer and Arlington ignore 
the realities of the litigation process and combine to impose an 
unreasonable and nearly insurmountable burden on parents of special 
education students. In order to carry the burden of persuasion in an 
IDEA action, parents must present experts to counter the school 
district’s expertise and informational advantage. Expecting parents to 
present expert witnesses when they are not able to recover witness 
fees is unrealistic, especially considering the average demographics of 
parents of special education students. When considered in the context 
of the history of the IDEA and its previous judicial interpretations, 
the cases signify a shift in the Court’s mentality and a new willingness 
to restrict the procedural rights and safeguards of parents—a shift 
unintended by the legislators who drafted these provisions. 
Yet, hope remains for special education parents. The Supreme 
Court left legislatures with several opportunities to circumvent the 
holdings in these cases and lessen the burden placed on parents. First, 
in Schaffer, the Court left state legislatures the option of statutorily 
placing the burden of proof on the school districts in IDEA 
proceedings.176 By shifting the burden of proof to school districts, 
 
 173. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF FORMAL 
DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY LOW AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND OTHER 
STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS 13 (2003). 
 174. Amicus Committee Statement of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, supra note 8. The 
data come from Department of Education studies and involve costs spent on mediation, school 
district hearings, and litigation. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 
2003, 150 CONG. REC. S5351 (May 12, 2004). 
 175. Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, COPAA Files Amicus Brief in Supreme 
Court Advocating Upholding Right to Recover Expert Witness Fees, http://www.copaa.org/ 
news/murphy.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). 
 176. See supra note 93. 
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states would greatly reduce the need for expert witnesses, thereby 
significantly lessening Arlington’s impact. Alternatively, Arlington left 
the door open for Congress to mitigate the burdens placed on parents 
by these decisions, saying, “[t]he ball . . . is properly left in Congress’ 
court to provide, if it so elects, for consultant fees and testing 
expenses beyond those IDEA and its implementing regulations 
already authorize.”177 If Congress amends the IDEA to provide for 
the recovery of expert witness fees, parents with valid claims against 
school districts would be more likely to find expert witnesses to 
support their cause, because they would be able to guarantee 
payment of fees upon prevailing in the action.178 
Such reforms are crucial to protect the accessibility of education 
for all students, which the Court recognized as a profoundly 
important tool for the nation’s success in Brown v. Board of 
Education more than fifty years ago.179 Despite the vast improvements 
in educational opportunities since Brown, especially in special 
education services, there is still plenty of room for improvement and 
more must be done to ensure every child has the opportunity to 
receive a “free appropriate public education.” Courts and legislatures 
must consider the realities of the litigation process and give parents 
the necessary tools with which to fight for their children’s education. 
When parents must pay for their own experts in order to satisfy the 
burden of proof in a hearing to guarantee their child’s free and 
appropriate education, that education is no longer free, but rather 
carries very high costs.180 
 
 177. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
 178. Although some parents might still be deterred by having to front the costs for experts, 
this deterrence could actually prove to be beneficial as it would serve as a method to weed out 
less meritorious claims or to encourage settlements. Parents with legitimate claims, however, 
should still be able to find expert witnesses who recognize the likelihood of prevailing on the 
merits and therefore will be willing to accept the case on a contingency basis. 
 179. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 180. See Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, supra note 103, at 4 (“All 
too soon, we may find that only families that can afford to hire experts to help their failing 
children will be able to enforce the rights and remedies secured by the IDEA. FAPE is no 
longer ‘free.’”). 
